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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Robert Stevenson appeals, contending that the district court erred in denying him 
credit for time served while on probation. In his opening brief, he acknowledged that 
Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals precedent holds that credit is not 
properly awarded for time spent on probation, but asserted those decisions should be 
overruled because they do not give effect to the plain language of the statute governing 
awards of credit for time served. The State responds, asserting that l\t1r. Stevenson did 
not recognize controlling precedent or argue the proper standard to justify overruling 
that precedent. It also disagreed with l\t1r. Stevenson's interpretation of the relevant 
statutes. As such, Mr. Stevenson deems a reply necessary to address those points. 
l\t1r. Stevenson also raised two other issues regarding the failure to provide him 
with requested transcripts and the denial of his motion for a reduction in his sentence. 
Since the State's responses on those issues are not remarkable, little reply is 
necessary. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Stevenson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Stevenson's motion for credit for 
time while on probation. 
2. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court deprived Mr. Stevenson of his constitutional 
rights to due process and equal protection by denying his request to augment the 
record with transcripts of hearings relevant to the issue of whether the district 
court should have reduced his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b). 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Stevenson's 
motion for a reduction in sentence. 
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I. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Stevenson's Motion For Credit For Time Served 
While On Probation 
A. The Prior Decisions On The Question Of Whether Credit Should Be Awarded For 
Time Served On Probation Should Be Rejected Or Overruled Based On The 
Plain Language Of The Credit Statute 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Stevenson asserted that the plain language of 
I.C. § 18-309, the statute governing credit for time served, allows for credit to be 
awarded for time served on probation. In making that argument, he acknowledged 
there were decisions holding to the contrary, but he that those decisions should 
be rejected, as they fail to give effect to the plain language of the statute. (App. 
Br., p.1.) The State responds, contending that credit is properly denied for time spent 
on probation. 
The State also asserts that Mr. Stevenson has ignored existing precedent in 
making his argument on the credit issue. (Resp. Br., pp.4-5 ("Ignoring these controlling 
precedents . . . . Stevenson has failed to acknowledge the foregoing precedents, much 
less show that they should be overturned.").) That assertion is untrue. Mr. Stevenson 
did acknowledge those decisions at the outset of his Appellant's Brief, but contended 
that "those decisions fail to give effect to the language of the statute, as written, and 
therefore, should be rejected." (App. Br., p.1.) He specifically cited to State v. Banks, 
121 Idaho 608, 610 (1992), State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 126 (Ct. App. 1996), and 
Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869-70 (Ct. App. 2008), in that regard. (App. Br., p.1 
n.1.) Additionally, by using the introductory signal "e.g.," he recognized that "other 
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authorities also state proposition, but citation to them would not helpful or is not 
necessary." BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM OF p.46 (Columbia Law 
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). As such, Mr. Stevenson did acknowledge the 
existing precedent on this issue. 
Mr. Stevenson also thought it was clear that, by arguing those precedents did not 
give effect to the plain language of the unambiguous statute, he was arguing that those 
precedents were manifestly wrong and should be overruled to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law. After all, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the courts' 
job is to give effect to the statute as written, and the power to correct a socially 
unsound, but unambiguous statutes lies with the Legislature. Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011 ). As a result, 
decisions that do not give effect to the plain meaning of the unambiguous statutes are 
manifestly wrong. 
When a decision has been shown to be manifestly wrong or overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law, or if it has otherwise been shown 
to be unjust or unwise, that decision should be overruled. State v. Humphreys, 134 
Idaho 657, 660 (2000). However, given the State's apparent confusion in this regard 
(see Resp. Br., pp.4-5), Mr. Stevenson would make it imminently clear that he is 
contending that prior decisions holding that credit may not be awarded for the time a 
person is on probation are manifestly wrong because they fail to give effect to the plain 
language of the relevant statutes, and therefore, should be overruled or otherwise 
disregarded. 
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That Credit Is Properly Awarded For Periods Of Time The Defendant Spends On 
Probation 
Mr. Stevenson contends that I.C. § 18-309 is unambiguous, and so, this Court 
should give effect to the plain language of that statute. However, the State contends 
that "[t]he objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent." 
(Resp. Br., pp.5-6 (citing State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144 (2010), and Robinson v. 
Bateman-Hal/, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210 (2003).) That is not a wholly accurate 
assertion, as the Idaho Supreme Court has made it extremely clear that: 
'"The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain 
meaning.' ... The interpretation of the statute 'must begin with the literal 
words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the 
statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply 
follows the law as written. 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 892-93 (quoting Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation 
Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 191-92 (2010), and State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 
(2003)). Furthermore, when it comes to criminal statutes, if the statute is ambiguous, 
and the ambiguity "exists as to the elements of or potential sanctions for a crime, this 
Court will strictly construe the statute in favor of the defendant." State v. Doe, 140 
Idaho 271, 27 4 (2004 ); see also State v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2014) 
("[l]f a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the statute must be 
construed in favor of the accused.") Therefore, only if the statute is ambiguous and the 
rule of lenity does not apply, do the courts turn to the legislative history of the statute, 
and seek to give effect to the legislative intent of the statute at issue. Verska, 151 Idaho 
at 506. 
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Stevenson's argument is that I § 18-309 is not ambiguous, and this 
should give effect to the plain language of that statute. Alternatively, the rule of 
lenity would apply if this statute is ambiguous. Therefore, because the credit statute is 
unambiguous, or because the rule of lenity applies, this Court should not have to 
discern the legislative purpose of the statute in this case. 
1. The Language Of I.C. § 18-309 Is Unambiguous And Does Not Prevent 
Credit For Time Spent On Probation 
The plain, unambiguous language of the credit statute, I. C. § 18-309, states that 
only the time for which a defendant is not entitled to credit against his sentence is the 
time is "by any legal means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and 
subsequently returned thereto." I.C. § 18-309. Giving this language its plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning, it is clear that the statute does not prevent credit for time served 
during probation, since probation is not a "temporary" release from incarceration, nor is 
a person "at large" while he is on probation. 
As an initial matter, the State appears to contend that, if the statute does not 
expressly authorize credit for a particular period of time, then it inherently denies credit 
for that period of time. (See Resp. Br., p.7 ("Because a probationer is necessarily not 
incarcerated, a defendant is not entitled to credit for time spent on probation.").) Based 
on this perspective, the State argues that the only time for which credit is authorized is 
the time a person was incarcerated, and since probation is not synonymous with 
incarceration, a probationer is not entitled to credit for time on probation. (Resp. 
Br., p.7.) While Mr. Stevenson agrees that probation is not synonymous to 
incarceration, the State's conclusion is wrong because the part of the statute on which it 
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rei only in terms of pre-judgment incarceration. I.C. § 18-309 ("shall receive 
credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to the entry of judgment, if 
such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment 
was entered") (emphasis added). However, probation is not an issue until after the 
judgment is entered, and so that portion of the statute is not relevant to the question of 
whether credit is properly awarded for time served on probation. 
In the post-judgment context, the statue provides: "The remainder of the term 
commences upon the pronouncement of sentence and if thereafter .... " I. C. § 18-309. 
That means the time accrued against the sentence (i.e., will be credited against the 
sentence) will start counting from the date the sentence was imposed, and will continue 
counting unless and until some other situation stops it from doing so. As a result, the 
State's approach to this question - that if credit for probation is not specifically 
authorized by the statute, it is not appropriately awarded - is directly contrary to the 
plain language of the statute as a whole. 
There is only one situation identified in the statute that stops the clock from 
running after the defendant's sentence has been pronounced "if, thereafter, during 
such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from such 
imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during which he was at large 
must not be computed as part of such term." I. C. § 18-309. The plain language of that 
portion of the statute means there are two prerequisite conditions that need to exist for 
the district court to properly deny post-judgment credit: (1) the person needs to be 
temporarily released from incarceration, and (2) he needs to be at large during that 




, nor at large, time against his sentence does not stop accruing 
of probation, and so, credit is appropriately awarded for that period of 
time where a person is on probation and adhering to the terms and conditions of 
probation. 
On the first of the prerequisite conditions necessary to deny credit, the State 
contends that Mr. Stevenson's release was temporary, in that his probation was 
ultimately revoked and his sentence executed, and so, contends that he is not entitled 
to credit for that time. (Resp. Br., p.6.) The State's argument promotes an overly-broad 
interpretation of the term "temporarily," which is based on the idea that all periods of life 
are necessarily finite, and therefore, temporary. As a result, it basically contends that a 
period of release may retrospectively be made temporary. However, that perspective is 
inappropriate in determining the legal ramifications of a statute. 
From the legal standpoint, the determination of whether the release was 
temporary should be made based on the time the relevant act - the release from 
incarceration- happened. Cf. Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937 (2014) (holding 
that, in general, statutes are meant to act prospectively; retrospective or retroactive 
statutes are disfavored); Wattenbarger v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 
315 (201 0) (holding that, when a term in a contract is unclear, the courts consider "the 
meaning intended by the parties at the time of contracting, not at some future time."). 
Thus, the appropriate question is, at the moment of release, was the release 
temporary? The answer in regard to a release on probation is "no," because, unlike a 
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This conclusion is particularly appropriate since the probationer has a protected 
liberty interest in not being sent back to prison. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 
(1972); State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766 (2007). The fact that those constitutional 
safeguards exist affirmatively demonstrates that the release on probation is not 
temporary, regardless of what happens afterward. This is an important distinction which 
means, basically, that the probationer becomes entitled to credit before any decision to 
revoke that probation is entered. As a result, this Court should reject the State's 
unsupported definition of the term "temporarily." 
As to the second prerequisite condition necessary to deny credit, the State only 
contends that the term "at large" means "'not imprisoned."' (Resp. Br., p.6.) The State 
cites no authority demonstrating that is a definition of the term, either in proper English 
or in common usage. Nor does the State address the fact that Mr. Stevenson's 
definition of the term "at large" (free; unrestrained; not under control (App. 
Br., pp.1 0-11 )) is consistent with the legal dictionary definition of the term, as well as its 
common usage in case law. (App. Br., p.12.) Therefore, the state's definition of "at 
large" should be disregarded. 
1 When an incarcerated inmate is released on furlough, he is allowed to leave the prison 
facility for a specific period of time, but then is expected to return to that facility at the 
end of the furlough period. Thus, from the outset, a furloughed inmate is temporarily 
released from imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, and would, therefore, 
be appropriately denied credit if he were at large during that time. The probationer, on 
the other hand, is not "temporarily" released from incarceration because he is not 
expected to return to the prison as a condition of his release. 
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Furthermore, the State's definition of the term large" is inappropriate because, 
if adopted, it would cause I § 18-309 to be inconsistent with other statutes, such as 
I.C. §§ 20-242 and 20-228. (App. Br., pp.13-14.) For example, an inmate who is 
granted furlough pursuant to I.C. § 20-242 is not in prison during his release, but he still 
able to serve his sentence (i.e., get it against his sentence) for the time he is out on 
furlough. See I. C. § 20-242(1 )-(2). However, applying the State's definition of at large 
(not imprisoned), I.C. § 18-309 would require that the furloughed inmate not get credit, 
since he would not be imprisoned during a period of his furlough. Similarly, I.C. § 20-
228 allows parolees to receive credit for time they are on parole, but the State's 
definition of "at large" would bar them from receiving such credit, since parolees are not 
imprisoned. Thus, the State's definition of "at large" would make Idaho's statutes 
inconsistent with each other. Since this Court strives to read statutes so that they will 
not be inconsistent with each other, see, e.g., Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Housel, 140 
Idaho 96, 104 (2004 ), and the State offers no explanation as to how its definition of the 
term "at large" would bring harmony to these statutes, its definition of the term "at large" 
should be rejected. 
Under the plain definition of "at large," it is clear why probationers adhering to the 
terms thereof probation are not properly considered to be at large. Probationers are 
definitely not free from restraint, as they remain subject to the control of their probation 
officers, pursuant to the terms of their probation. They would only be free from that 
restraint or not under control (and thus, would be at large) when they abscond 
supervision. (App. Br., pp.10-17.) Therefore, a probationer adhering to the terms of his 
probation is not "at large" and so, there is no period of time while he is adhering to the 
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terms of his probation that will the clock from running 
there was no allegation that Mr. Stevenson had c"-''~\Jv 
large. (See generally R., pp.1 06-08.) 
his As 
supervision, he was not at 
Therefore, since neither of the two prerequisite conditions that are necessary to 
deny credit in the post-judgment context is present in this case, this Court should 
reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Stevenson's motion for credit for time 
served. 
2. If The Credit Statute Is Ambiguous, The Rule Of Lenity Should Apply 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Stevenson argued that, if this Court determines that 
the State's interpretation of the credit statute is also reasonable, the rule of lenity should 
apply and the statute read in his favor. (App. Br., p.18.) The State argues that the rule 
of lenity does not apply in this case because it does not believe Mr. Stevenson's 
interpretation of the statute is reasonable. (Resp. Br., p.7.) However, as demonstrated 
in the Appellant's Brief and in this brief, there is substantial precedential and textual 
support for Mr. Stevenson's interpretation of the credit statute. Therefore, despite what 
the State believes, his interpretation is a reasonable interpretation. Thus, if this Court 
believes that the State has also put forth a reasonable interpretation (which 
Mr. Stevenson does not concede), there would be two reasonable interpretations of the 
statute. In that case, because that would render this criminal statute ambiguous, the 
rule of lenity would apply in this case. The result is that Mr. Stevenson should be 
credited for the time he spent on probation adhering to the terms thereof. 
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II. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Deprived Mr. Stevenson Of His Constitutional Rights To Due 
Process And Equal Protection By Denying His Request To Augment The Record With 
Transcripts Of Hearings Relevant To The Issue Of \Nhether The District Court Should 
Have Reduced His Sentence Pursuant To I.C.R. 35(b} 
Mr. Stevenson acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court recently issued its 
opinion in State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218-20 (2014), which addressed several of 
the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief. However, as the State's response in this 
regard is not remarkable, no further reply in this regard is necessary. He simply refers 
this Court back to pages 18-24 of his Appellant's Brief. 
Ill. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Stevenson's Motion For A 
Reduction In Sentence 
Because the State's argument concerning the denial of Mr. Stevenson's motion 
for a reduction of sentence is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. 
Accordingly, Mr. Stevenson simply refers the Court back to pages 24-28 of his 
Appellant's Brief. 
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Mr. Stevenson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the denying his 
motion for credit for time served and that it remand this case for a proper calculation of 
credit. He also respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Stevenson respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the decision to deny his motion for leniency and reduce 
his sentence as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand the case for a reduction 
of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
DATED this 31 51 day of July, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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